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The World was recent glued to their Television sets, watching the humiliating defeat of Paul Kagame’s M23 Militia out-fit. The defeat was not only a blow to criminal Paul Kagame, but also his worshipers around the world that don’t see beyond his arse , because their heads are stuck in there, and are busy influencing the international community basing from what they see and pick from the criminal’s dirty arse.
Why would any sane person compare Congo’s-DRC potential to that of Rwanda’s-its like comparing a teak to an Elephant. One is a parasite and the other a Victim-however, that does not mean, that the elephant will collapse and die. However, the pain and expoitation of the elephant’s body, the source should be found and eliminated, and in this case, its Paul Kagame.
The writers of-history will remember criminal Paul Kagame as the most arrogant and lethal parasite that caused the death of 6 million plus people in the Democratic Republic of Congo while the world cheered,worshiped and dined him. The shameless betray of Congolese,Rwandan and friends of the great Lakes area, did not only hurt them, but also made them to question the values of those Nations, namely USA and UK.
Why would a former president and prime minister put their heads in the arse of a known terrorist worse than Osama Bin Laden, and should their values be the ones we all emulate?? Never, in fact, many Congolese tend to switch off their TV sets whenever Bill Clinton and Tony Blair are aired-why would someone want to listen to accomplices of Congo genocide??
I remember there was a time when such people were considered role models and inspiration, but not in this case as something is very wrong…very wrong. With them ignoring the voices crying out for Justice….. and instead comfortably placing their heads in Kagame’s arse because its nice there, history will judge them as Justice never decays.
By allowing a little fuck like Paul Kagame still dripping with the blood of his victims to influence your conscience, I’m sure that- whenever you look in the mirror, you both feel dirty and disgusted. However, its not too late, listen to the voices of the people and do the right thing. Dump the little fuck and work with positive forces.
Both Rwanda and Congo are bigger than that little coward!! After losing his prized militia that had been metamorphosing into different different little fucks till recently M23, Paul Kagame is very wounded and very paranoid. The humiliation he suffered in Congo, has now been turned on the Rwandan populace both Domestic and Diaspora.
His paranoi has been turned on Hutu children-he has asked them to apologise for the crimes of their parents against the Tutsi in the 1994 genocide. This should also be done officially and a recept of the confession given and presented whenever accessing government services. In short, what Kagame is saying is that, all Hutus killed Tutsis and they should all apologise.
I will try and give you a background of the War
The World has come to associate Interahamwe with the Rwanda genocide, and has become the official narrative the world dances too. Its very true that the genocide against Banyarwanda was systematically planned since 23rd January 1991. The Rwanda Patriotic Front believed in using Violence as a tool of political struggle-thus,Frantz Fanon’s theory of violence (THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH) became the main indoctrination tool, and it was a must for all political commissars to read it. Its the same book that RPF mentor, Yoweri Museveni had used to sow Violence in Uganda.
Before 6 April 1994 around 1 million Rwandans from the northern part of the country were internally displaced as a result of the invasions of the RPF in 1990 The RPF planning for the invasion was deliberate – taking nearly three years from the founding of the group – and was inhibited by the need to organize in secrecy within the Ugandan army.
Fred Rwijyema knew that the RPF and NRA had been infiltrated by Habyarimana. Accordingly, only a small, “special planning group” of Tutsi officers within the NRA was permitted to know in advance the timing and plan of the invasion. Other Tutsi officers and enlisted soldiers knew something was being planned, but received only one day’s notice of the actual invasion.
Rwijyema believed he needed about 1,000 troops to succeed, but was concerned that Museveni would stop him. His plan, after crossing into northeast Rwanda, was to move south by foot about 20 miles to attack a lightly guarded Rwandan army barracks at Gabiro that would provide weapons and ammunition for his troops.
Rwijyema believed he needed about 1,000 troops to succeed, but was concerned that Museveni would stop him. His plan, after crossing into northeast Rwanda, was to move south by foot about 20 miles to attack a lightly guarded Rwandan army barracks at Gabiro that would provide weapons and ammunition for his troops.
He planned then to move about 20 miles west into the hills of Byumba province, which he believed would provide a secure base for a protracted guerrilla struggle, analogous to those he had carried out successfully with Museveni in Uganda. Rwijyema believed that if his forces could reach Byumba, “not even God can move us from there”.
Rwijyema and other senior rebel officials anticipated a protracted struggle against a more numerous and better equipped Rwandan army. The RPF expected to have about 1,000 rebels on foot with small weapons facing the 5,000-strong Rwandan army that was outfitted with armored vehicles and helicopters. In addition, the rebels expected that foreign powers, including Belgium, France, and Zaire, probably would intervene to support the army, and they discussed this prospect explicitly prior to the invasion. Anticipating that France could not be dissuaded from intervening-Rwijyema directed his external affairs chief – at the start of the invasion – to plead with Zaire and Belgium not to intervene. The RPF prepared food stores and follow-on invasion routes in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. This included planting crops in neighboring states and preparing dried beef for an extended campaign.
Rwijyema and other senior rebel officials anticipated a protracted struggle against a more numerous and better equipped Rwandan army. The RPF expected to have about 1,000 rebels on foot with small weapons facing the 5,000-strong Rwandan army that was outfitted with armored vehicles and helicopters. In addition, the rebels expected that foreign powers, including Belgium, France, and Zaire, probably would intervene to support the army, and they discussed this prospect explicitly prior to the invasion. Anticipating that France could not be dissuaded from intervening-Rwijyema directed his external affairs chief – at the start of the invasion – to plead with Zaire and Belgium not to intervene. The RPF prepared food stores and follow-on invasion routes in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. This included planting crops in neighboring states and preparing dried beef for an extended campaign.
The formal RPF decision to invade was made around July 1990, approximately the same time Rwandan President Habyarimana proposed his initiatives for the peaceful repatriation of Uganda’s Tutsi refugees. At the end of September, the RPF gave the order for Tutsi soldiers in the Ugandan army to desert their posts and head south. Rwijyema, now retired from the army, met the troops and told onlookers he was taking them to celebrations for Uganda’s independence day on October 9.
To lend credibility to the cover story, the soldiers left behind most of their heavy military equipment – further indication that Museveni did not support the initial invasion. On October 1, 1990, Rwijyema led the troops across the border into Rwanda. He had worried about not getting even the requisite 1,000 troops, but was met by about 4,000 Tutsi soldiers (including 120 officers), and another 3,000 Tutsi civilians who joined spontaneously upon hearing that the long-awaited return to Rwanda finally was being launched. The war did not go as planned for the rebels.
Their commander, Rwijyema, was killed on the second day(RIP). Habyarimana responded to the invasion by launching both a military counterattack and a crackdown on civilians – Tutsi and opposition Hutu – who were accused of supporting the rebels. Within three days, he had detained 10-15,000 domestic opponents, eventually imprisoning an estimated 8-13,000.
The RPF made an initial advance southward, but after Zairean armored units cut off their rear, the rebels diverged from Rwijyema’s original target of heading northwest for cover in the hills of Byumba. Instead, the rebels proceeded south and west through open savanna, where they were vulnerable to the better equipped, more mobile Rwandan army supported by the Zaireans and French. In a decisive battle on October 23, the Rwandan army killed 300 rebels,including two of their top three remaining commanders.
That left only Paul Kagame, who was in the United States at the time of the invasion. Museveni had sent Kagame, the Ugandan army’s chief Admin of intelligence, for training at the U.S. army’s Fort Leavenworth, possibly in an unsuccessful attempt to forestall an RPF invasion of Rwanda. Kagame returned to the region on October 14, 1990, replaced the late Rwijyema as military commander of the RPF, and belatedly began to establish a rebel command structure.However, this is not true as Paul Kagame was more into intelligence gathering than administer the troops. Its a lie that has been told to the world to promote Paul Kagame and also conceal gross crimes against humanity.
The RPF has no consideration for any human being value. They kill children, women elders and refugees without remorse
On February 8, 1993, the rebels broke a seven-month cease-fire and rapidly captured a large swath of northern Rwanda, including portions of the hard line Hutu stronghold of Ruhengeri. Within two weeks, the rebels doubled the territory under their control and approached within 20 miles of the capital, Kigali, appearing poised to capture it. In the course of the operation, the rebels also killed many Hutu civilians. The government characterized these as massacres, while the rebels claimed that the victims mainly were collateral damage, killed when the rebels retaliated against Hutu troops and militias who were attacking from within civilian areas
The RPF justifies its offensive on grounds that Habyarimana was refusing to make concessions at Arusha while continuing to orchestrate periodic massacres of Tutsi civilians. Indeed, only weeks earlier, Habyarimana’s representative at the peace talks, Col. Theoneste Bagosora, had left in anger, announcing he was going home “to prepare the apocalypse” Soon after, from January 22-31, 1993, Hutu forces killed some 300 Tutsi in northern Rwanda, which brought the toll of such massacres since the start of war to around 2,000 (Jones, 1999, p. 141).
On February 8, 1993, the rebels broke a seven-month cease-fire and rapidly captured a large swath of northern Rwanda, including portions of the hard line Hutu stronghold of Ruhengeri. Within two weeks, the rebels doubled the territory under their control and approached within 20 miles of the capital, Kigali, appearing poised to capture it. In the course of the operation, the rebels also killed many Hutu civilians. The government characterized these as massacres, while the rebels claimed that the victims mainly were collateral damage, killed when the rebels retaliated against Hutu troops and militias who were attacking from within civilian areas
The RPF justifies its offensive on grounds that Habyarimana was refusing to make concessions at Arusha while continuing to orchestrate periodic massacres of Tutsi civilians. Indeed, only weeks earlier, Habyarimana’s representative at the peace talks, Col. Theoneste Bagosora, had left in anger, announcing he was going home “to prepare the apocalypse” Soon after, from January 22-31, 1993, Hutu forces killed some 300 Tutsi in northern Rwanda, which brought the toll of such massacres since the start of war to around 2,000 (Jones, 1999, p. 141).
The RPF says it perceived that Habyarimana was attacking domestic Tutsi civilians in an effort to coerce concessions from the rebel group at the negotiating table, and that it had to demonstrate to him that this was not an acceptable tactic. However, the rebels apparently intended more than just to send signals and had invoked their long-standing “zed option.” If their offensive had not provoked French military intervention and international political condemnation, they were ready to conquer the country.
As one senior rebel puts it, “We could have won, but the international community wouldn’t let us. France would aid the army and the international community would criticise us.” Following the RPF’s dramatic display of strength, and spurred by renewed pressure from the international community, Habyarimana soon conceded to virtually all of the rebels’ remaining demands at Arusha. He agreed to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the transformation of his office of president into a largely symbolic office, a transitional government prior to democratic elections, and a small UN peacekeeping force to facilitate security during the transition.
But peace talks bogged down over two power-sharing issues: which parties would be represented in a transitional government before new elections, and how would the rebel and government troops be integrated into a combined army? Habyarimana and his Hutu cronies from northwestern Rwanda feared that, if the Tutsi rebels and their allies within the Rwandan opposition were allowed to dominate the transition government and army, the outcome would be essentially a negotiated coup. Under this scenario, the Hutu elite feared they would at best lose the privileges of rule, and at worst suffer deadly retribution for their violence against Tutsi during the war and their years of corruption and favoritism.
The rebels argue that they too made multiple concessions. For example, they accepted the Hutu regime’s demand for a dual-command structure in the combined army. They agreed that refugees would not necessarily return to their home regions within Rwanda due to concerns about overpopulation. They accepted a complex transitional power-sharing arrangement rather than absolute control.
The rebels argue that they too made multiple concessions. For example, they accepted the Hutu regime’s demand for a dual-command structure in the combined army. They agreed that refugees would not necessarily return to their home regions within Rwanda due to concerns about overpopulation. They accepted a complex transitional power-sharing arrangement rather than absolute control.
They conceded to a UN peacekeeping force, even though they preferred an all-African force to reduce French influence. And they agreed to accept a 60-40 split in the enlisted ranks of the combined army, rather than the 50-50 split they sought and which they received for the officer corps. However, these were marginal concessions and did not impinge on the RPF’s unceasing demand that Habyarimana hand over to them effective political and military control of Rwanda. Indeed, even the rebels admit that Habyarimana made the lion’s share of the concessions.
They attribute this to three factors: the rebels’ unrelenting military pressure; the international community’s threat to cut off aid to Habyarimana; and the internal Hutu opposition, which Habyarimana had to appease to retain ethnic support, and which was unarmed and therefore favored a negotiated outcome rather than military victory by either side. Habyarimana’s cronies felt betrayed and terrified. They immediately set out to undermine the implementation of the accords, working in conjunction with the president. Although Habyarimana’s motivation and intent at the time still remain somewhat clouded, he clearly was walking a political tightrope. He apparently perceived that it would be political suicide – if not literal suicide – either to refuse to sign the accords or actually to implement them. If he refused to sign, the international community including France had threatened to suspend economic and military assistance, which would leave his regime at the mercy of the rebels.
But if he actually started implementing the accords, he risked being killed either by the entrenched Hutu elite, which sought to block implementation in order to preserve its power and physical security, or by the Tutsi rebel elite, which would take over key positions in the army and government, whence they could seek revenge for past offenses. Thus, he pursued a third, middle path: signing the accords but doing everything possible to avoid implementing them as originally intended.
At the same time, extreme elements within the ruling Hutu clique prepared their own “final solution” to retain power and block what they perceived as a Tutsi attempt to re-conquer Rwanda after thirty-five years of Hutu emancipation. These Hutu extremists apparently believed that by preparing to kill all of the Tutsi civilians in Rwanda they could prevent the country from being conquered by the rebels. Accordingly, they imported thousands of guns and grenades and hundreds of thousands of machetes, and transformed political party youth wings into fully fledged armed militias.
At the same time, extreme elements within the ruling Hutu clique prepared their own “final solution” to retain power and block what they perceived as a Tutsi attempt to re-conquer Rwanda after thirty-five years of Hutu emancipation. These Hutu extremists apparently believed that by preparing to kill all of the Tutsi civilians in Rwanda they could prevent the country from being conquered by the rebels. Accordingly, they imported thousands of guns and grenades and hundreds of thousands of machetes, and transformed political party youth wings into fully fledged armed militias.
To foment Hutu fear and anti-Tutsi hatred they also created a new private radio station as an alternative to the existing, somewhat more moderate government channel. They apparently also established a clandestine network of extremists within the army to take charge when the time came. When the Tutsi rebels became aware of these activities in early 1994, they responded by training in earnest for the resumption of war, which only fed Hutu anxieties.
This crescendo of fear was exacerbated still further in February 1994 by a wave of mutual political assassinations. By early 1994, the rebels had two choices. They could finally make concessions in their demands for power – for example, by letting the now dominant Hutu Power wings pick the opposition parties’ representatives in the transitional government – in the hope of averting massive retaliatory violence against Tutsi civilians. Or the rebels could maintain their hard line and prepare a final military offensive to conquer Rwanda. They chose the latter.
After Habyarimana created his Interahamwe militia in 1992, the rebels encouraged opposition parties to form their own militias, which some did. The RPF also offered to arm and train them in its northern occupied zone, but most refused because they either did not trust the rebels or feared reprisal from Habyarimana. The RPF redoubled these efforts in early 1994.
In February 1994, the RPF also started arming and training separate Tutsi “self-defense forces” within Rwanda to defend against the expected retaliatory massacres. When the genocide started, the program was a few months away from fruition, so that most Tutsi in Rwanda still were defenseless. In the first two months of 1994, some RPF officials also proposed publicly exhorting the “expected targets” of retaliation in Rwanda – that is, all Tutsi – to flee the country.
After Habyarimana created his Interahamwe militia in 1992, the rebels encouraged opposition parties to form their own militias, which some did. The RPF also offered to arm and train them in its northern occupied zone, but most refused because they either did not trust the rebels or feared reprisal from Habyarimana. The RPF redoubled these efforts in early 1994.
In February 1994, the RPF also started arming and training separate Tutsi “self-defense forces” within Rwanda to defend against the expected retaliatory massacres. When the genocide started, the program was a few months away from fruition, so that most Tutsi in Rwanda still were defenseless. In the first two months of 1994, some RPF officials also proposed publicly exhorting the “expected targets” of retaliation in Rwanda – that is, all Tutsi – to flee the country.
However, the rebels worried this could cost them international support by suggesting they intended to violate the cease-fire. Moreover, it would stigmatize the Tutsi in Rwanda as fifth-columnists, reinforcing the worst accusations of the Hutu extremists. Instead, the RPF decided to communicate discreetly to certain groups of domestic Tutsi that they should flee Rwanda. According to rebel officials, most such Tutsi refused to leave on the grounds that they expected the UN peacekeepers to protect them if violence broke out.
During the first months of 1994, the RPF also prepared a final military offensive to conquer the country. First, it withdrew its top political officials from Kigali, where they had been deployed in December 1993 along with a rebel battalion to prepare for installation of the transitional government under the Arusha accords Next, it infiltrated additional rebels to the capital, increasing the battalion’s strength from 600 to about 800.
During the first months of 1994, the RPF also prepared a final military offensive to conquer the country. First, it withdrew its top political officials from Kigali, where they had been deployed in December 1993 along with a rebel battalion to prepare for installation of the transitional government under the Arusha accords Next, it infiltrated additional rebels to the capital, increasing the battalion’s strength from 600 to about 800.
Third, it ordered rebels in the northern zone, who had been training lightly in preparation for integrating with the Rwandan army, to switch to a “war-footing,” to be prepared to “react quickly,” and to train for “urban warfare” – indicating they soon would be fighting to capture the capital. Fourth, the RPF developed a war plan, under which the reinforced battalion in Kigali would pin down most Rwandan army troops, leaving the rest of the country to be captured by a separate rebel offensive.
The plan was risky because the rebel battalion headquarters in Kigali was ringed by five Rwandan army battalions and several additional army companies around the city, but the RPF was cautiously optimistic about its prospects. As a senior rebel recalls, “We thought we could defend ourselves as the FAR [Rwandan army] came to us [in Kigali].
It would leave them vulnerable to our main thrust from the north, but still we were scared. It was guts.” Then, on April 6, 1994, as President Habyarimana was flying back to Rwanda from a conference in Tanzania, he was killed when his private plane was shot down by surface-to-air missiles during approach to Kigali. Hutu extremists quickly blamed the Tutsi rebels for the attack and seized effective control of the government.
Its well known that during the official so called Rwanda genocide(100 days), members of RPF worked with gangs of interahamwe and also held leadership positions in those gangs. Thus, there were several Interahawe groups working autonomously, and most killings by interahamwe in Biryogo and Kiyovu, were carried out by Abakombozi(liberators) a Pro-RPF group.
Its well known that during the official so called Rwanda genocide(100 days), members of RPF worked with gangs of interahamwe and also held leadership positions in those gangs. Thus, there were several Interahawe groups working autonomously, and most killings by interahamwe in Biryogo and Kiyovu, were carried out by Abakombozi(liberators) a Pro-RPF group.
The Abakombozi was very sophisticated in a way that they could place a camera man at a vantage point to film the slaughter. In-fact most of the footage that was shown on western media, was filmed by the Abakombozi killers. “All Interahamwe thugs, Impuzamugambi, Abakombozi,and Inkuba moved around with RPA inflitrators that were only answerable to Lt Colonel Jackson Rwahama of the Directorate of Military intelligence. The same Jackson Rwahama also ordered the death of several Priests, including Spanish ones.
There is a lot of untold stories which hold the truth of the reality about the genocide in Rwanda. For example, most mass graves in Butare are of Hutus, killed by RPF pretending to give them a pacification meeting.The mass graves in Gashora Commune are of Burundian Hutu refugees who were killed in a mosque by the RPF, in collaboration with the Burundian Tutsi soldiers that had crossed the border to help the RPF in April 1994.
There is a lot of untold stories which hold the truth of the reality about the genocide in Rwanda. For example, most mass graves in Butare are of Hutus, killed by RPF pretending to give them a pacification meeting.The mass graves in Gashora Commune are of Burundian Hutu refugees who were killed in a mosque by the RPF, in collaboration with the Burundian Tutsi soldiers that had crossed the border to help the RPF in April 1994.
Those Burundian refugees were called in the mosque for a meeting about how they would continue to get their food rations and other health facilities from the RPF, they were instead massacred. Interahamwe means “people of about the same age, of the same generation; an object of the same size or same value; people who get on well together. Thus, Interahamwe was transformed as a propaganda tool by the RPF to mean “those who kill together.” They used machetes and nail studded clubs.
They entered churches, schools, football stadiums and hospitals to finish off the wounded, hacking women, children and even men to death. “Interahamwe had the blessing of a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful people as long as they are on the wrong side of the political fence. However, Interahamwe belonging to MRD, double crossed Abakombozi Interahmwe (Pro RPF)of Cyahafi Sector in Nyarugenge Commune, by killing them.
The Interahamwe belonging to MRND ruling party, cruelly killed Tutsi people, but also killed Hutu from Butare (banyenduga) because they were Southerners MRND ruling party was mostly Northerners. At the time, it was a policy for RPF to kill educated Hutus-thousands of Tutsi were killed by the RPF because they did not contribute money or send their sons for military training to Uganda before the war.
This is not hearsay, but facts and survivors plus perpetrators of RPF crimes are ready to testify. Its unacceptable for RPF regime to continue labeling all Hutus as genocidals Despite this, the RPF clung to its strategy: refusing to compromise its demands for political power, while accepting retaliation against Tutsi civilians as the price of achieving that goal, even as the price climbed much higher than expected.
This RPF calculus was reflected both in the rebels’ battle plan and their initial refusal to test government cease-fire offers. Primarily, the battle plan was designed to conquer the country, rather than to protect Tutsi civilians from retaliatory violence. Had the rebels placed higher priority on protecting Tutsi civilians, they would have raced quickly to the country’s southwest where most domestic Tutsi, some 86 percent, lived in the six prefectures of Kigali, Butare, Gitarama, Gikongoro, Cyangugu, and Kibuye. However, the rebels feared casualties if they tried to penetrate the line between the Rwandan army’s two strongholds in Kigali and Ruhengeri. Instead, the rebels initially moved east, where “the campaign was easier because the terrain was flatter” and few army troops stood in the way, intending to envelop the capital clockwise.
The rebels swept through the eastern half of Rwanda in about two months, on foot, bypassing army units ensconced on strategic high ground. This unorthodox strategy succeeded because the dispersed army units in the east eventually ran out of logistics and apparently lacked the nerve to confront the rebels directly. However, the rebels’ circuitous route did have a major cost: by the time they reached the southwest in June 1994, most of the Tutsi there already had been killed. Interestingly, the RPF initially had ordered one unit of rebels to proceed immediately to the southwest but then worried they could be outflanked by the Rwandan army and so recalled them.
This incident illustrates how the RPF gave higher priority to military effectiveness than protecting Tutsi civilians. The RPF defends its decision to pursue an eastern route on grounds that the best way to save Tutsi civilians was to defeat the Rwandan army that “provided the psychological and physical environment for the killers.” However, the rebels almost certainly could have saved many more Tutsi, albeit at higher military cost, if they had pursued a southwestern offensive. During the first two and a half weeks of genocide, the rebels also repeatedly rejected cease-fire offers from the government.
Then, in late April 1994, they realized the genocide was being carried out so quickly that most Tutsi would be killed before the rebels could conquer the country. At this point, the rebels apparently decided that the expected cost in retaliatory violence had risen so high – total annihilation of Rwanda’s Tutsi population – that it was no longer acceptable as the price of achieving their goal. However, the RPF persistently underestimated the eventual toll of retaliation.
At the time of their invasion, the rebels expected “maybe five- to ten- thousand” reprisal killings, according to Rutaysire. By late 1993, the Tutsi rebels grew to expect tens of thousands of retaliatory deaths if they persisted in their challenge, but the eventual “scale took us unawares,” he says. Rudasingwa concurs that, “we knew the mass killings would occur,” but were surprised by “the speed and the viciousness.” Tito Rutaremara says the rebels explicitly rejected such forecasts: “The French were warning us of this eventuality. But we took it as blackmail. We didn’t expect the final extent.” Nevertheless, given that the RPF from the start did expect its challenge to provoke thousands of retaliatory civilian killings, this challenge cannot be explained by failure to anticipate such a reaction. There were continuous reports reaching the camps , for example, arbitrary arrests, detentions and executions by RPA soldiers of persons suspected of membership in the Interahamwe or participation in the genocide, with no recourse to formal judicial proceedings.
There were also reports of arbitrary arrests and disappearances being carried out by militia and private persons. In addition, returnees were finding their homes occupied by former Tutsi refugees who had fled Rwanda over a period of 30 years and who had returned home after the RPF came to power. In such cases, the returnees had no recourse to justice, either because the judicial system did not exist or because it was not functioning independently. All efforts to put the RPF to trial by independent jurisdictions have been opposed by the Rwandan government. Indeed, French and Spanish judges had issued international warrants against some members of the RPF and the response of the Rwandan government has been to ignore them. In most of the cases, the Rwandan government prefers to sever diplomatic relations in order to protect those murderers
A British reporter, Nick Gordon, investigated and reported that RPF regime built crematoriums at Bugesera,Ruhengeri, Byumba, Kibungo, Nyungwe and other locations where thousands of Hutus are killed daily and their bodies incinerated under the program called “MANPOWER DUTIES” while US officials are looking the other way. The Tutsi regime is conducting genocide in Rwanda to reduce the Hutu population to an “Imaginable Levels”.
Now, should Hutu children apologise to Tutsi families, or it should be Paul Kagame for his poor planning and War Crimes??
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